Abstract This article describes and analyses the changes which have occurred to pre-trial detention and interrogation and to the trial process in Ireland as a result of the apparent threat posed by organised criminality. The templates for these measures often derive from extraordinary tactics first used against subversive paramilitary groups. However, while incursions have been made on protective procedural rights and rules, important safeguards remain which counterbalance such trends.
crime, 3 coupled with low conviction rates 4 and high-profile incidents, like the murders of Garda Jerry McCabe and journalist Veronica Guerin in 1996, have precipitated considerable political rhetoric and demands for legislative action.
The widely held belief in political and popular discourse is that the procedural rights which accrue to the individual suspect or accused must be reconsidered, as the undue concern with due process rights is to the detriment of the effective pursuit of crime control and the safety of the law-abiding public. The President of the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors has stated that:
the criminal justice system has swung off balance to such an extent that the rules are now heavily weighted in favour of the criminal, murderer, drug trafficker and habitual offender.
5
The Garda Commissioner has argued, to similar effect, that the system is:
in need of examination, with the burden of proof on the prosecution now set so high as to be, in most prosecutions, almost unachievable and the search for truth being sacrificed in a web of technicalities.
6
The rights of the individual in the Irish criminal process
The threat of organised crime in Ireland has resulted in the abrogation of various rights of the accused throughout the criminal process. Although the Irish Supreme Court has stressed that 'in accordance with the values on which our system of law rests, the acquittal of the guilty is not of the same order of injustice as the conviction of the innocent', 7 the procedural rules which aim to protect the individual are not immutable. They can be altered to mirror an evolving understanding of the appropriate relationship between the State and the individual and the perceived effectiveness of the criminal justice system. As Galligan commented, '[p] rocedures are themselves deeply rooted in a social context and will reflect the beliefs and understandings prevailing in them'. 8 Some of the rights which accrue to the individual in the Irish criminal process are being eroded by the imperatives of crime control and public protection in the fight against organised criminality. The most significant alterations to the pre-trial stage in recent years involve the issue of search warrants, the detention of the suspect, and the right to silence throughout interrogation. Moreover, during the trial, evidence from persons on the Witness Protection Programme is used, trials are held in non-jury courts, and previous inconsistent statements are increasingly admitted. Nevertheless, these changes should not necessarily be overstated in terms of the incursions they make on suspects' rights, given the safeguards that still remain, including the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, the inadmissibility of compelled evidence, the recording of Garda interviews, and the rules pertaining to confession evidence.
The pre-trial process
Several developments in pre-trial criminal process exemplify the shift from due process values to a more result-oriented model of crime control in a bid to tackle organised crime. The first to be explored involves the issue of search warrants.
Search warrants
The powers conferred on the Gardaí (Irish police) to search premises pursuant to a search warrant, which they possess 'in defined circumstances for the protection of society', 9 have been enhanced in recent years by permitting the officers themselves to issue warrants. While warrants are generally issued by a judge of the District Court 10 or by a peace commissioner (magistrate) upon formal application by a member of the Gardaí, 11 senior police officers may issue warrants in urgent circumstances. Such a power was first granted by s. 29 of the Offences Against the
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State Act 1939, for offences under that Act and for treason. 12 This tactic was then adopted to counter organised criminality, in s. 8(1) of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 and s. 14(2) of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, both of which allow a Garda not below the rank of superintendent to issue a search warrant, if circumstances of urgency which necessitate its immediate issue render it impracticable to apply to a District Court judge or a peace commissioner.
13
Although in People (DPP) v Byrne Hardiman J stressed that the power of a Garda superintendent to issue a warrant 'cannot be regarded as anything other than an emergency provision', 14 s. 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 expands this approach to incorporate all arrestable offences. 15 Thus a measure which was first deployed against subversive crime, then later organised crime, has now percolated into the general criminal justice system. 16 Search warrants issued by senior Garda members are endorsed on the belief that crucial evidence could be destroyed without the immediate issue of a warrant and because of the need to investigate crime effectively and expeditiously. 17 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the removal of judicial supervision is warranted, as it is unclear if grave difficulties regarding the grant of warrants This suggestion has not been acted upon by the legislature, which has continued to extend the powers of the Gardaí in this regard.
19
The circumvention of judicial scrutiny, and thus the absence of an independent examination of the justifications motivating the request for a warrant, renders the process susceptible to abuse and may harm its integrity. Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, the IHRC proposed that the warrant provision should require the issuing superintendent to limit the scope of the search and to exclude himself from direct involvement in that particular investigation, 20 but this safeguard was not included in s. 6 of the 2006 Act.
Detention
The capacity of the Gardaí has been further augmented by the introduction of lengthy periods of detention and questioning for certain offences. The purpose of arrest under the common law was to take the suspect into police custody to charge him with an offence and to bring him before a judge to answer the charge; 21 interrogation or evidence-gathering could not be lawful motivating factors for arrest. The right to silence In addition to the intensification of State powers regarding search and detention, the right to silence of the accused is gradually being eroded, so as to improve the likelihood of successful prosecution and preclude the evasion of justice on the part of suspected organised criminals. This right, which intersects and overlaps with the presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination 35 and the right to privacy, 36 is a fundamental element of the principle that the prosecution must establish and prove the case against the accused. The rationale behind the right's very existence is to compensate for the imbalance of power and resources that exists between the State and the accused. It is seemingly unappealing for the State to place the accused in a position whereby he is likely to be punished whether he answers or remains silent when questioned. 37 In addition, the right is underpinned by the rationale of guarding against unsafe convictions. 38 Nevertheless, there is a growing belief in political and popular discourse that the right to silence assists the guilty to evade the full rigours of the law. This is borne out in a comment of the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors: The present status of the right to silence is an historical relic and harks back to a previous age when suspects were deemed to be of limited intelligence. It is untenable that in serious crimes such as murder and rape, theft or fraud, suspects can refuse to disclose their whereabouts when questioned and courts cannot draw inferences from this.
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As the majority of people will never be interrogated in police custody, the right to silence may seem superfluous and useful only to persons who wish to conceal evidence of illegal activity. 40 This sentiment has taken legislative form in recent years, with serious encroachments on the right to silence becoming more commonplace.
A number of statutory provisions which are used in combating organised criminality penalise the accused for remaining silent; that is, the accused's failure to answer will result in a sanction, rather than merely permitting an inference to be drawn. Under s. 52(1) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, a Garda may demand a full account of a detainee's actions during a specified period of time, in addition to all information known to him regarding the commission by another person of an offence under the Act. 41 Although this measure was originally introduced in response to sedition, it may now be used against organised crime, given that firearms offences fall within the remit of the 1939 Act.
42
The constitutionality of s. 52 was upheld in Heaney v Ireland where the restriction on the right was deemed to be proportionate with respect to the aims of the section to investigate and punish serious, subversive crime. 43 The Irish Supreme
Court adjudged that the right of the citizen to remain silent was of lesser importance than the right of the State to protect itself and to maintain public peace and order. 44 However, this reasoning was not accepted by the European Court of In addition to these provisions which in effect criminalise silence, a number of measures on the Irish statute book permit the drawing of inferences. Section 18 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 allows inferences to be drawn from the failure or refusal of the accused upon arrest to account for marks, objects or substances when asked to do so by a Garda who reasonably believes that their existence may be attributable to his participation in the commission of an offence. Moreover, inferences may be drawn from the presence of an accused at a particular place if the arresting Garda reasonably believes that his presence may be attributable to participation in the commission of an offence. 49 The constitutionality of these provisions was upheld drawing provisions under the 1984 Act pertain to the accused's response to the questions of the Gardaí, the 2007 Act places an onerous burden on the suspect who must envisage the particular facts which are likely to be used in his defence. This may result in injustice, due to the fact that the accused may honestly forget to mention facts or details on which he later seeks to rely in court.
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Infringements on the right to silence are seen as necessary in order to tackle organised crime. Although s. 7 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 (the precursor to s. 19A) was described as 'minimalist' in the Irish Parliament, 57 this provision represents a significant shift in the fundamental balance of the criminal process, in which the crime control objectives of the State impinge more and more on due process values. As the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) said:
The most basic civil liberties issue is the right to life and bodily integrity, to one's personal possessions and one's personal freedom.
The arguments for the unrestricted right to silence of an accused … are academic by comparison.
58
Penalising silence and allowing inferences to be drawn renders the accused a source of information for the police, thereby intensifying the strain on the individual. Furthermore, compulsion to assist the police on penalty of imprisonment involves a significant infringement on individuals' right to determine the extent of their cooperation with agents of the State. Such measures suggest a growing preference for public protection and crime control over traditional norms of due process and personal autonomy.
59
The criminal trial in Ireland testimony from individuals in the Witness Protection Programme (WPP); and greater admissibility of previous inconsistent statements.
Restricting the right to trial by jury
Trial by jury is traditionally regarded as a central element of the common law criminal justice system. As the Constitutional Review Group stressed, it brings a democratic element to the criminal justice system and therefore should not be interfered with lightly. 60 The rationale behind this right was articulated by Henchy J in People (DPP) v O'Shea, invoking memories of 'politically appointed and Executive-oriented judges, of the suspension of jury trial in times of popular revolt, of the substitution … of summary trial or detention without trial, of cat-and-mouse releases from such detention, of packed juries and sometimes corrupt judges and prosecutors'. 61 Accordingly, the best way to prevent wrongful conviction was to allow the accused:
to 'put himself upon his country', that is to say, to allow him to be tried for that offence by a fair, impartial and representative jury, sitting in a court presided over by an impartial and independent judge appointed under the Constitution, who would see that all the requirements for a fair and proper jury trial would be observed.
62
Despite the importance of the right to jury trial, there is 'a tendency to think that, if anything goes wrong or is thought likely to go wrong with the criminal process, the first thing to do is to get rid of the jury', 63 and indeed this is evident in the trial of non-subversive crimes (that is, crimes which do not fall under the rubric of the Offences Against the State Acts 1939-1998) in the SCC.
The Irish DPP has considerable power to circumscribe the right to a jury trial, by requiring that a case be heard before the non- 66 the DPP may request SCC trial for non-scheduled offences on the basis that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order, 67 and the judge must acquiesce in such 'requests'. The DPP's power is not judicially reviewable in the absence of mala fides. 68 This lack of review is problematic, given the significant effect of a change of venue on the right of the accused to jury trial.
The trial of a non-scheduled case in the SCC arguably breaches the right to equality under Article 40.1 of the Irish Constitution, given that only certain criminal cases are referred by the DPP. This issue was circumvented in Kavanagh v Ireland where the Supreme Court held that determining the adequacy of the ordinary courts was a political decision outside the judicial sphere. 69 However, when Kavanagh petitioned the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), the Committee criticised the legislature's ability to specify by statute which offences were to come within the jurisdiction of the SCC and to permit other offences to be so tried at the discretion of the DPP. 70 The UNHRC noted that reasons need not be given for these opinions and, moreover, that judicial review is 'effectively restricted to the most exceptional and virtually undemonstrable circumstances'. 71 Ireland was deemed not to have established that the decision to try Kavanagh before the SCC was based upon reasonable and objective grounds. Accordingly, the UNHRC held that Kavanagh's right to equality under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) had been violated. 72 Nevertheless, when Kavanagh sought to have this decision applied in the Irish courts, it was held that the ICCPR did not form part of Irish domestic law. 73 It is regrettable that this serious infringement on the right to equality has not been recognised in Ireland.
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A further contentious issue is that the judges in the SCC must act as arbiters of both fact and law. This poses particular problems as regards inadmissible evidence, when the judges may be required to exclude incriminating material from their minds. Indeed, it is questionable whether this is truly possible. asserted that while the members of that court may be exposed to prejudicial material when examining sensitive information, judges are capable of dealing with the case fairly and in accordance with law. 75 It is submitted that Finlay CJ's more principled analysis should be adopted, given that it is unreasonable to expect any person 'to "unbite" the apple of knowledge'. 76 Furthermore, the court is not required to disqualify itself from a case where it has heard inadmissible evidence which is prejudicial to the accused, although it has the discretion to do so. 77 It would not be impracticable to require the court to dismiss itself from a case in which such evidence has been tendered, given that the panel of judges for the SCC is sufficiently large to allow a reconstituted court to hear the case. 78 Despite the historical origins of this special jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has stressed that Part V of the 1939 Act, which governs the establishment of the SCC, is not concerned solely with subversive activities but rather pertains to the adequacy of the ordinary courts. 79 Indeed, cases which have been heard in the Special
Criminal Court in recent years that lack any apparent subversive element include offences of kidnapping; 80 the murder of journalist Veronica Guerin; 81 and a charge of receiving a stolen caravan and its contents. 82 In this way, limitations on the right to jury trial have seeped into the 'ordinary' criminal justice realm. 83 
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The primary reason adduced to justify the continued restriction on the right to a jury trial is the possibility that juries in the trial of organised criminals will be subject to threats or intimidation. 84 As Walsh J noted in People v Quilligan:
There could well be a grave situation in dealing with ordinary gangsterism or well-financed and well-organised large scale drug dealing, or other situations where it might be believed or established that juries were for some corrupt reason, or by virtue of threats, or of illegal interference, being prevented from doing justice. 85 Similarly, in Kavanagh v Ireland, Keane J stated that persons engaged in nonsubversive crime could be tried before a special non-jury court where there appeared to be a significant risk of jury intimidation or corruption. 86 Indeed, the , an application may be made by the prosecution to a judge of the Crown Court for a non-jury trial on indictment where there is evidence of a real and present danger that jury tampering would take place, and where, notwithstanding any reasonable preventative steps, a substantial likelihood of tampering occurring makes it necessary in the interests of justice for a non-jury trial. Nevertheless, the key difference between the English and the Irish models is the lack of judicial oversight in the latter jurisdiction.
While non-jury trials are permitted in limited circumstances in neighbouring jurisdictions, the scheme in the Offences Against the State Act 1939 provided a useful archetype in the Irish context which allowed this procedural modification to be adopted seamlessly for the trials of those suspected of organised crimes.
92
The Special Criminal Court is now seen as a normal feature of the Irish criminal justice system, and there is little political or popular pressure to have the court disbanded.
93
The Witness Protection Programme Further evidence of the modification of traditional standards, so as to facilitate the expedient resolution of crime, is evident in the growing use of testimony given by persons participating in the Witness Protection Programme (WPP) in the trial of suspected organised criminals. As will be demonstrated, some aspects of the WPP give rise to concerns about due process. Participation in the Programme is only available to a witness with evidence to offer in relation to serious crimes such as
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drug trafficking and organised crime, and this evidence must be essential to the prosecution and not available elsewhere. 94 Moreover, a substantial threat to the safety of the witness must exist. 95 The witness may be-and in practice often will be-an accomplice or associate of the suspect, 96 so in essence, this means that such evidence is confined to quintessential 'organised crimes'.
The use of evidence from individuals who are under the protection of the State is comparable to the use of 'supergrass' or informant testimony in trials for subversive crimes where traditional investigative tactics are seen as ineffective, as they were in trials of alleged terrorists in the 1980s. 97 In the contemporary Irish setting, testimony from individuals in the WPP is justified by the secretive nature of criminal gangs which renders conventional investigative and prosecutorial approaches less effective and thereby necessitates the adoption of alternative methods of evidence-gathering. The establishment of the WPP has been described as 'a recognition that Irish society was as amenable to the threat of organised crime as any other society'. 98 The Programme ensures that prosecutions may be taken in cases of serious organised crime such as those involving drugs and money laundering, 99 and to this extent guards against the perversion of justice by those who seek to suppress vital evidence at major trials. 100 Political acquiescence in the use of accomplice testimony in Ireland itself is to be contrasted with Irish politicians' vehement rejection of such measures in Northern Ireland.
101
Whatever its claimed advantages, the WPP also raises concerns in relation to the method of witness recruitment, the type of people recruited, and the preparation
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of such witnesses for trial. 102 Furthermore, the enticements offered to witnesses and the probability that such witnesses are motivated by self-interest suggest that the use of such evidence should be closely monitored and corroborated. 103 The
Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP v Gilligan accepted that benefits are inherent in the WPP, but stressed that evidence given in return for a specific sum of money from the Gardaí or the prosecution would be inadmissible. 104 The court further emphasised that strict delineation of the permissible benefits offered to witnesses and the manner in which negotiations are to take place is vital to ensure the reliability of testimony. 105 While the Supreme Court on appeal acknowledged that elements of Garda procedures compromised the evidence of some witnesses, this did not undermine the entire system. 106 Although the benefit given to witnesses in the WPP has been regarded as problematic in certain instances by the Irish courts, it is generally not seen to damage the validity of the evidence. Nevertheless, in order to ensure the integrity of the evidence and of the Programme as a whole, it would be preferable for the courts or the legislature to provide guidelines or standards concerning the appropriate benefits for witnesses, in addition to regulating the conduct of the Gardaí.
107
The corroboration, if any, required of evidence given by WPP witnesses is a further contentious matter, given the motivation and typically criminal status of such individuals. In DPP v Gilligan, the Irish Supreme Court highlighted the danger of acting upon the uncorroborated evidence of a witness in the WPP, namely that in the hope of receiving benefits the witness may not tell the truth. 108 Nevertheless, the court concluded that there is no rule of law that such uncorroborated evidence must be rejected. The trier of fact must be warned that it is dangerous to convict on uncorroborated evidence, but may nevertheless do so if the evidence is so clearly acceptable that the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 109 The WPP was accepted as part of the State's legitimate response to the changing nature of crime, including organised crime, gang
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violence, and drug trafficking. 110 In addition to this judicial approval, increased expenditure on the Programme indicates growing reliance on this tactic in combating organised crime. 111 Indeed, it has been argued that to require corroboration in such cases would be 'to pander to organised crime'. 112 Against this, it is submitted that rejecting the need for corroboration compromises the integrity of the trial process and increases the likelihood of miscarriages of justice due to the questionable motivations behind WPP witnesses' testimony. Requiring corroborative evidence would represent a cautious approach reflecting concern for due process, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.
Previous inconsistent statements
Section 16 of the Irish Criminal Justice Act 2006 provides for the admission in evidence of previous witness statements. This provision was introduced in response to the collapse of a murder trial in Limerick in 2003, where six witnesses who had previously given statements to the Gardaí recanted and refused to testify against the accused in court, resulting in a notice of nolle prosequi by the DPP. 113 The
Minister for Justice emphasised that this situation posed a challenge 'for the Irish State, for the rights of individual citizens and of entire communities, and for the system of criminal justice'. Urgent legislative action was said to be required. 114 Before the 2006 Act, a prior inconsistent statement could be introduced as evidence which destroys the witness's credibility but not as direct testimonial evidence against the accused. 115 In other words, an inconsistent statement simply undermined the evidence of the witness by impugning his credibility. This limitation posed significant problems for the prosecution, particularly in cases 
Counterbalancing the repressive trend
Although significant changes have been made to the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal process in Ireland which augment the powers of the State to the detriment of the rights of the accused, the capacity of the courts to offset the potential punitive effects of these developments is evident in a number of important safeguards. The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence and compelled statements, the recording of police interrogations, the criteria governing the use of confession evidence, the Judges' Rules and the Treatment in Custody Regulations all serve to compensate, at least to some extent, for the erosion of individual rights in the criminal process. the accused person' must be deemed inadmissible 'where no extraordinary excusing circumstances exist'. 126 He emphasised that the defence of constitutional rights is superior to the duty to try individuals for a criminal offence. 127 Similarly, in People (DPP) v Kenny, Finlay CJ recognised that, while the exclusion of evidence can limit the ability of the courts to determine the truth and so to administer justice, the detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons … cannot … outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation 'as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen'.
Illegally obtained evidence
128
Evidentiary exclusion encapsulates the courts' elevation of constitutional rights over the expedient investigation of crime. Nevertheless, the Minister for Justice has expressed his desire to review this rule of evidence, if it 'leads to the unintended outcome of accused persons regularly getting away with crimes on a technicality'. 129 Similar sentiments have been expressed by the DPP 130 and by a majority of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group. 131 In light of these comments, change to the protective exclusionary rule may be anticipated.
Recording police interviews
One development which could guard against the possibility of coercive actions by the Gardaí is the recording of police interrogations. 132 The Moreover, legislative extensions of the power to draw adverse inferences have been interpreted restrictively by the courts. In People (DPP) v Finnerty, the Supreme Court emphasised that unless the right to silence is expressly abrogated by statutory provisions permitting inferences to be drawn against the accused, the common law doctrine prohibiting any adverse inference must be upheld.
140
Confession evidence
Stringent rules governing the admissibility of confession evidence may also counterbalance the erosion of individual rights at the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal process. The rules governing the admissibility of confession evidence are strict: statements deemed 'involuntary' will be excluded. 141 The courts may also declare a confession to be inadmissible where it followed an inducement or suggestion on the part of the Gardaí that the suspect would gain some advantage, 142 or where it was made as a consequence of oppression. 143 A pre-trial admission may also be excluded at trial if the circumstances in which it was procured fall below the requisite standard of fairness. 144 More generally, s. 10 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993 requires the judge to warn the jury against convicting on uncorroborated confession evidence.
The Judges' Rules and the Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody Regulations
In addition, the Judges' Rules and the Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody Regulations 1987 145 moderate the harshness associated with custodial interrogation. The Judges' Rules, which were approved in Ireland in People v Cummins, serve as the basic guide to police conduct. 146 As the Judges' Rules are not formal rules of law, failure to adhere to them does not automatically result in the exclusion of evidence acquired as a result of the breach. 147 Nevertheless, in People v Farrell, the Court of Criminal Appeal stressed that, while the Judges' Rules are merely rules for the guidance of persons taking statements, they 'have stood up to
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the test of time and will be departed from at peril'. 148 Only in very exceptional circumstances will a statement taken in breach of the rules be admitted in evidence, and every such breach calls for an adequate explanation. 149 The Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody Regulations also protect the accused. These regulations pertain to matters such as notification of solicitors, the information to be given to the accused on being detained, and the proper form of custody records. However, s. 7(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 provides that failure to abide by the regulations does not 'of itself' render the custody of the accused unlawful, nor does it affect the admissibility of any statement made.
150
Conclusion
The burgeoning threat of organised crime in Irish society has precipitated the introduction of new legal measures and the proliferation of investigative tactics originally deployed against subversion activities. Pre-trial protections and aspects of the trial itself have been altered so as to augment the powers of the State and thereby increase its ability to combat gangland criminality effectively. The issue of search warrants by the Gardaí, the extension of detention periods and the erosion of the right to silence indicate a preference for the exigencies of crime control over the due process rights of the individual, and represent a move towards a more result-oriented way of thinking. In court, the right to a jury trial has been circumscribed, the Witness Protection Programme is increasingly used, and witnesses' previous inconsistent statements may be relied on as evidence against the accused. The overarching rationale for these measures lies in the imperative of public protection and the drive for successful convictions, which has the effect of eclipsing individual liberties.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the continued existence of safeguards which counterbalance incursions on individual rights in the Irish justice system. The inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence and compelled statements, the recording of Garda interviews, the rules governing the use of confession evidence, the Judges' Rules and the Treatment of Persons in Garda Custody Regulations offset the attenuation of individual rights in the criminal process. These examples suggest that the drift away from due process is not unmitigated. Protective devices exist which temper the impact on the accused of more repressive legislative developments.
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While organised criminals might be portrayed as threatening the justice system, it is submitted that the phenomenon of organised crime should be seen as a serious social problem rather than precipitating a pervasive legal crisis with the potential to subvert the organs of the State. Indeed, it seems that there has been a blurring of the conventional distinction between social problems and national emergency 151 in Ireland, which eases the seepage of emergency measures and tactics into the ordinary legal arena. Organised crime in Ireland has not infiltrated the fabric of government nor does it seem likely to compromise the pursuit of justice. Moreover, it is questionable whether the purported flaws in the existing trial system truly demand extraordinary remedies at the cost of significant rights.
As the DPP recently remarked:
In the vast majority of cases brought to court, the trial system functions well. About 90% of indictable prosecutions end in a guilty plea, and of the remainder about half end in conviction and half with an acquittal, leaving an overall conviction rate of about 95% ...
152
This is not to downplay the fact that serious and gun-related crime is a growing problem in Ireland, 153 which may in fact merit the revision of traditional approaches to crime control. Interpretations of civil liberties and rules of the criminal process may need to be updated or altered given the shifting nature of crime. However, any adjustments must be grounded in careful political analysis and widespread popular debate, must be based on adequate evidence of both the need to act and the likely efficacy of the proposal, must be in the public interest and should involve minimal restrictions on rights. Such measured consideration and implementation of procedural reform is currently lacking in the Irish context, which is characterised by ad hoc and pragmatic rather than principled reactions to the perceived threat of organised criminality.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 233
